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ABSTRACT 
Despite the possibility of qualified-majority voting, member states in the Council of the 
European Union (EU) still adopt most policies by consensus. To address this puzzle, I 
develop an agent-based model of coalition building in multilateral negotiations. The model 
demonstrates that consensual decisions can emerge as an unintended by-product of 
government representatives’ desire to form blocking coalitions. A qualitative case study 
demonstrates the plausibility of the model’s assumptions and resulting coalition building 
dynamics. In addition, a quantitative test shows that the model’s predictions correspond 
closely to the observed consensus rates. Finally, computational experiments predict a 
positive effect of the voting threshold but no effect of increases in membership on winning 
coalition size, which has important practical implications for institutional design and 
enlargement policy. 
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CONSENSUS DECISIONS DESPITE MAJORITY RULE 
The Council’s formal decision-making rules have regularly been a major point of contestation in 
negotiations leading to reforms of the European Union’s (EU) constitutional rules.2 The extension 
of qualified-majority voting to new policy areas, the precise voting threshold, and the individual 
voting weights of member states have frequently been subject to heated debates in the 
intergovernmental conferences concerned with amending the EU’s treaties. Most recently, 
disagreement over member states’ future voting weights almost derailed negotiations leading up to 
the Lisbon treaty; and despite the further extension of qualified majority voting, some member 
states still insisted to retain the unanimity rule in areas like taxation and social security, which are 
subject to particular national sensitivities. At the same time, relevance of the voting rule in day-to-
day legislative decision-making of the Council seems rather limited. Decision-making in most 
major policy areas under Union jurisdiction has long been subject to qualified majority rule, yet 
unanimous decisions are still the norm rather than the exception in the Council of the EU.3  
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 See e.g. David R Cameron, 'The Stalemate in the Constitutional IGC over the Definition of a Qualified Majority', 
European Union Politics, 5 (2004), 373-91; Geoffrey Garrett, 'International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The 
European Community's Internal Market', International Organization, 46 (1992), 533-60; Axel Moberg, 'The Nice 
Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council', Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 259-82. The Council is the 
main legislative body of the EU and consists of representatives of member state governments. The Council of the EU is 
also known as the Council of Ministers. The Lisbon Treaty extended the powers of the European Parliament as an equal 
co-legislator considerably, but some areas are still the exclusive domain of the Council. 
3
 Mikko Mattila and Jan-Erik Lane, 'Why Unanimity in the Council? A Roll Call Analysis of Council Voting', 
European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 31-52; Fiona Hayes-Renshaw, Wim Van Aken, and Helen Wallace, 'When and 
Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly', Journal of Common Market Studies, 44 (2006), 161-94; Dorothee 
Heisenberg, 'The Institution of 'Consensus' in the European Union: Formal Versus Informal Decision-Making in the 
Council', European Journal of Political Research, 44 (2005), 65-90; Sara Hagemann and Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, 'Old 
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The lack of voting in the Council is even more puzzling in light of recent accessions to the 
Union, which almost doubled the number of member states from 15 to 27. These enlargements 
included mostly countries from Central and Eastern Europe, with very different levels of economic 
development, as well as cultural and political histories. Based on standard collective decision-
making theories, many observers consequently predicted a rise in policy stability resulting from an 
increase in the heterogeneity of member states’ policy positions.4 If a larger set of member states 
with more heterogeneous preferences makes it harder to reach agreements, then we would also 
expect to see more reliance on qualified majority voting rather than consensus decision-making in 
the Council. However, as further described below, the empirical record does not only show that 
voting is relatively rare in the Council, but also that this tendency was not affected in any way by 
the recent ‘big-bang’ enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe.  
In this paper, I present a theoretical model that can account for both puzzling observations. 
Consensus decision-making is defined as the adoption of a collective decision without contesting 
votes.5 I argue that consensus emerges more or less coincidentally from the coalition-building 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Rules, New Game: Decision-Making in the Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement', CEPS Annual 
Conference, 1 March 2007, Brussels; Mikko Mattila, 'Roll Call Analysis of Voting in the European Union Council of 
Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement', European Journal of Political Research, 48 (2009), 840-57. 
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 George Tsebelis and Xenophon Yataganas, 'Veto Players and Decision-Making in the EU after Nice', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 283-307; Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger, 'Accession and Reform of the 
European Union: A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Eastern Enlargement and the Constitutional Reform', European 
Union Politics, 5 (2004), 419-39; Christina Zimmer, Gerald Schneider, and Michael Dobbins, 'The Contested Council: 
Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution', Political Studies, 53 (2005), 403-22. 
5
 Importantly, the absence of voting does not imply that consensus is based on a convergence of actors’ preferences. 
This definition is consistent with the more or less implicit use of the term in much of the existing literature on Council 
decision-making, see for example Hayes-Renshaw et al., 'When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes 
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process itself. If the formal rules allow for qualified majority decision-making in the Council, then 
member states have an incentive to coordinate their behaviour and their negotiation positions with 
other like-minded states. Otherwise they run the risk of becoming marginalized and their positions 
ignored in the negotiation process. Negotiations in the Council are usually complex, involving a 
multitude of issues and actors. In light of such complexity, boundedly rational actors are likely to 
follow simple heuristics to guide their behaviour.6 A plausible heuristic for government 
representatives is to band together with negotiators from other states with similar positions until 
their coalition is large enough to formally block a decision. Being part of a blocking minority 
ensures that the member state’s views cannot be ignored. At the same time, joining other states that 
have negotiation positions close to its own limits the policy concessions the state has to make. 
Successively joining up with states or coalitions of states in this manner, member states form larger 
and larger coalitions until they reach the necessary numbers to constitute a blocking minority. If, at 
the end of this process, all member states are organized in blocking minority coalitions, then no 
policy can be adopted without unanimous consent. Thus, consensus emerges endogenously as an 
unintended by-product of the coalition building behaviour of negotiators that seek to form blocking 
minority coalitions. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Explicitly'; Heisenberg, 'The Institution of 'Consensus' in the European Union: Formal Versus Informal Decision-
Making in the Council'.   
6
 Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein, 'Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality', 
Psychological Review, 103 (1996), 650-69; Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1982). 
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The remainder of this paper develops an agent-based model to formalize this argument and 
explores the model’s empirical plausibility and theoretical implications.7 In the next section, I 
present data on consensus decision-making in the Council of the EU and discuss several candidate 
explanations. Following the discussion of available data and theories, I present a brief case study of 
Council decision-making. The case description illustrates the type of coalition-building dynamics 
that the computational model aims to capture. It also demonstrates the plausibility of the 
assumptions made about member states’ behaviour. Subsequently, I present the agent-based 
computational model and illustrate its dynamics through the description of a typical simulation run. 
Next, the model’s predictions of the aggregate consensus rate for different membership sizes are 
compared to the observed consensus rates in the Council of the EU. Despite the model’s simplicity, 
it is not only able to reproduce the qualitative features of the data, that the rate of consensus 
decisions is relatively high and that the rate is insensitive to changes in the number of member 
states, but it also yields rather accurate quantitative predictions. Given these encouraging results, 
the last part of the analysis consists of a computational experiment to further investigate the effects 
of the voting threshold and the number of member states on the size of the typical winning 
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 For recent applications of this modelling technology in Political Science, see for example Michael Laver and Ernest 
Sergenti, Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). For introductions to 
agent-based modelling as a scientific method, see Joanna J. Bryson, Yasushi Ando, and Hagen Lehmann, 'Agent-Based 
Modelling as Scientific Method: A Case Study Analysing Primate Social Behaviour', Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 362 (2007), 1685-99; Scott de Marchi, Computational and Mathematical 
Modeling in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); John H. Miller and Scott E. Page, 
Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007); and Steven F. Railsback and Volker Grimm, Agent-Based and Individual-Based Modeling: A Practical 
Introduction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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coalition. The experiment shows that membership size does not have a discernible influence on 
winning coalition size, whereas the voting threshold displays a strong positive association. Finally, 
in the conclusion, I summarize the results and discuss the potential of competitive theory tests to 
rule out alternative explanations in future research. I also elaborate on the scope conditions of the 
theory to gauge the extent to which it is transferable to other collective decision-making contexts.  
LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING IN THE COUNCIL OF THE EU 
The constitutional rules of the EU allow the Council to adopt legislative decisions by a qualified 
majority of member states’ votes, but explicit voting in general, and negative votes or abstentions 
in particular, are relatively rare.8 Despite successive enlargements and re-definitions of individual 
voting weights, the qualified majority threshold has remained remarkably constant over time, 
varying only between 71% and 74%.9 Figure 1 presents data on the proportion of legislative 
Council acts adopted by consensus between 1994 and 2006.10 The time period covers three 
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 Mattila and Lane, 'Why Unanimity in the Council? A Roll Call Analysis of Council Voting'; Hayes-Renshaw et al., 
'When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly'; Heisenberg, 'The Institution of 'Consensus' in the 
European Union: Formal Versus Informal Decision-Making in the Council'; Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 'Short 
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Analysis of Voting in the European Union Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement'. Note that, under the 
qualified majority voting rule, abstentions have the same effect as negative votes. 
9
 Hayes-Renshaw et al., 'When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly', 180-81. 
10
 The data for the years from 1994 to 2002 are taken from Table 1a of Heisenberg, 'The Institution of 'Consensus' in 
the European Union: Formal Versus Informal Decision-Making in the Council', 72; the data for the years from 2003 to 
2006 are taken from Table 3 of Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 'Short Old Rules, New Game: Decision-Making in 
the Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement', 13. The consensus rates are based on contested votes only (i.e. 
negative votes or abstentions). Member states also have the opportunity to attach formal statements to the minutes of 
the meeting in which an act is adopted. Member states who voted in favour of the adoption of the act sometimes use 
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different membership sizes. In 1994, the EU consisted of 12 member states. Sweden, Finland, and 
Austria joined on 1 January 1995, increasing the number of member states to 15. Eight formerly 
communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe and two Mediterranean island states became 
members on 1 May 2004, further raising the number of member states to 25.11 Over this period of 
time, on average 82% of all legislative acts enacted during a particular year were adopted by 
consensus. Based on standard collective decision-making theories, we would expect to see less 
consensus decisions after increases in membership size, given that more member states with 
heterogeneous preferences need to be accommodated to reach unanimous agreement.12 Yet the 
observed rate of consensus decisions clearly contradicts this expectation, as it seems to be largely 
unaffected by changes in membership size.13 
Figure 1 about here 
Consensus decision-making in the Council has long been a puzzle and several explanations have 
been advanced to account for the lack of voting. First, the institutionalist explanation stresses the 
foresight of the Commission, its powers as agenda-setter in EU decision-making, and the 
configuration of member state preferences relative to the status quo. A peculiar feature of the EU is 
                                                                                                                                                                 
such statements to voice their discontent with aspects of the act. This study is interested in explaining why member 
states do not outvote each other even though the formal rules allow for the adoption of acts by majority vote. Thus, the 
appropriate dependent variable is member states’ voting behaviour. Whether or not member states also choose to 
comment on their voting behaviour through formal statements is not relevant for answering this question. 
11
 The time-period covered does not include the latest accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. 
12
 Tsebelis and Yataganas, 'Veto Players and Decision-Making in the EU after Nice'; König and Bräuninger, 'Accession 
and Reform of the European Union: A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Eastern Enlargement and the Constitutional 
Reform'; Zimmer et al., 'The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution'. 
13
 If anything, the consensus rate increases somewhat over time. 
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that the Commission has the exclusive right to initiate legislation. Anticipating the positions of 
member states, the Commission might only introduce a proposal when a sufficient majority of 
member states exists to support the new policy.14 As a result, only proposals with a relatively high 
chance of being adopted are actually discussed in the Council. The selection effect posited by this 
theory is in line with empirical evidence about the very low rejection rates of Commission 
proposals.15 
Although the Commission’s role as agenda-setter and its strategic foresight might be able to 
account for why we see few rejected proposals, these elements of the theory are not sufficient to 
explain the relatively low number of negative votes on proposals that are actually adopted. Taking 
the preferences of governments into account, the Commission should be able to formulate a 
proposal that is just about acceptable to a minimum winning coalition of member states.16 In this 
scenario, oversized winning coalitions are only expected to occur if the disagreement between 
member states about the precise formulation of the new policy is small compared to their shared 
negative assessment of the existing status quo.17 Consensus decisions reflect a true agreement 
among member states about the undesirability of the status quo and the direction of policy change. 
                                                 
14
 Bernard Steunenberg, 'Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European 
Community', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1994), 642-69. 
15
 Thomas König, Brooke Luetgert, and Tanja Dannwolf, 'Quantifying European Legislative Research: Using Celex 
and Prelex in EU Legislative Studies', European Union Politics, 7 (2006), 553-74; Frank M. Häge, ‘The European 
Union Policy-Making Dataset’, European Union Politics, 12 (2011), 455-477. 
16
 The argument also holds if the Presidency, or any other member state, is considered to be the agenda-setter inside the 
Council.  
17
 Mattila and Lane, 'Why Unanimity in the Council? A Roll Call Analysis of Council Voting', 37. 
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In such a situation, the formal decision-making rule really does not matter; the same agreement 
could have been reached under unanimity.18 
The second type of explanation highlights compliance concerns as possible explanation for 
consensus decision-making. The EU depends largely on member state governments and 
administrations for the transposition, implementation, and enforcement of European law. Member 
states that have been outvoted when the act was adopted might oppose ‘through the backdoor’ by 
delaying the act’s implementation or by implementing it incorrectly.19 According to this view, laws 
are adopted by consensus at the European level to avoid compliance problems when those laws 
have to be put into force at the national level.20 The third type of explanation stresses the possibility 
of log-rolling between member states.21 If member states vary in the salience they attribute to 
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 Situations in which such Pareto-improving policy changes are possible might be quite common in the EU. For 
example, Scharpf argues that decision-making on product-related regulations exhibits the strategic structure of a 
coordination game, in which member states agree that a uniform EU standard is preferable to the existing plethora of 
national standards. Although a distributional conflict about exactly what type of uniform standard to implement still 
exists, all member states are better off with some uniform standard than none. See Fritz W. Scharpf, 'Negative and 
Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States', in Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe 
C. Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds, Governance in the European Union (London: Sage, 1996), 15-39. 
19
 Gerda Falkner, Miriam Hartlapp, Simone Leiber, and Oliver Treib, 'Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the 
Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?', West European Politics, 27 (2004), 452-73. 
20
 Hayes-Renshaw et al., 'When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly'; Giovanni Maggi and Massimo 
Morelli, 'Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations', American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 1137-58; 
Volker Rittberger and Bernhard Zangl, International Organization: Polity, Politics and Policies (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 68. 
21
 Mattila and Lane, 'Why Unanimity in the Council? A Roll Call Analysis of Council Voting', 46; Clifford J. Carruba 
and Craig Volden, 'Explaining Institutional Change in the European Union: What Determines the Voting Rule in the 
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different policy issues, then opportunities for vote-trading exist. For example, issue 1 might be 
extremely important to member state A, while issue 2 is important to member state B. Then 
member state A can trade its consent on issue 2 for member state B’s consent on issue 1. Oversized 
coalitions can result as a side-effect of such vote trades. Finally, the fourth type of explanation 
stresses internalized norms and rules of behaviour to account for the absence of voting in the 
Council.22 Following this cultural argument, negotiators developed a consensus reflex as a result of 
years of Council negotiations under the so-called Luxembourg compromise.23 The Luxembourg 
compromise stipulated that unanimous agreement had to be reached, even in areas where qualified 
majority voting was formally allowed, if a member state felt that the decision affected important 
national interests. New entrants to Council negotiations are supposedly quickly initiated to and 
internalize this culture of compromise. Thus, according to this perspective, the lack of voting is due 
to internalized consensus norms. 
While all discussed theories provide more or less plausible explanations for consensus 
decision-making, they all have trouble with the observation that the consensus rate remains largely 
constant despite a considerable increase in the number of member states in recent years. According 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Council of Ministers?', European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 5-30; Thomas König and Dirk Junge, 'Why Don't Veto 
Players Use Their Power?', European Union Politics, 10 (2009), 507-34. 
22
 Jeffrey Lewis, 'The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union', 
International Organization, 59 (2005), 937-71; Jeffrey Lewis, 'The Methods of Community in EU Decision-Making 
and Administrative Rivalry in the Council's Infrastructure', Journal of European Public Policy, 7 (2000), 261-89; 
Heisenberg, 'The Institution of 'Consensus' in the European Union: Formal Versus Informal Decision-Making in the 
Council'. 
23
 Jonathan P. Aus, 'The Mechanism of Consensus: Coming to Agreement on Community Asylum Policy', in Daniel 
Naurin and Helen Wallace, eds, Unveiling the Council of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 99-118. 
10 
 
to the institutionalist perspective, more member states are likely to introduce more heterogeneous 
preferences. The increased disagreement should result in more negative votes and therefore a lower 
consensus rate. The larger numbers and increased preference heterogeneity through enlargement is 
also problematic for the compliance argument. The marginal returns for the majority of member 
states to accommodate yet another recalcitrant government arguably decrease with increases in the 
number of member states. An ambitious policy that is implemented imperfectly only in a small 
number of member states might be preferable to a completely watered down version, even if that 
version was uniformly applied across the Union. Regarding the logrolling explanation, the demands 
of vote trading on the cognitive abilities of negotiators increase exponentially with the number of 
member states. Vote trading amongst 25 member states is disproportionally harder and hence 
disproportionally less likely to be successful than vote trading amongst 15 member states. The 
expected outcome should again be a decrease in the consensus rate.24 Finally, informal norms are 
more difficult to sustain in larger groups and newcomers are less likely to be socialized into those 
norms when they enter the group in large numbers. Thus, at least the enlargement from 15 to 25 
member states in 2004 should have affected the consensus culture in a negative way, resulting in a 
lower rate of consensus decisions. As Figure 1 shows, the empirical data clearly contradict these 
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 Whether or not logrolling is a competing or complementary explanation depends largely at the negotiation stage at 
which it is supposed to take place. The computational model developed below is agnostic about the precise mechanisms 
through which the compromise agreement between blocking coalitions at the final stage of negotiations is reached. 
Log-rolling across issues within a proposal could surely be one of those mechanisms. Forming blocking coalitions 
reduces the effective number of actors and policy positions and therefore the cognitive demands on negotiators, making 
successful vote trading more likely. From this point of view, the two explanations potentially complement each other 
and could be combined in a sequential manner. The conclusion briefly discusses how a competitive empirical test could 
look like if the two theories are considered alternatives. 
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expectations. In contrast, the output of the computational model developed below is consistent with 
the observed pattern.25  
REAL-WORLD COALITION BUILDING: A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE 
The model of coalition building developed here aims to capture salient features of empirically 
observed behaviour of member states in Council decision-making under qualified majority rule. To 
illustrate these kinds of coalition building dynamics, Figure 2 displays the initial negotiation 
position of member states and subsequent changes in those positions on two salient issues during 
the negotiations on the Council’s common position on the batteries directive.26 Each panel presents 
a snapshot of negotiation positions at a certain point in time. The horizontal axis indicates positions 
on the extent and timing of a ban on cadmium in batteries. The vertical axis indicates member 
states’ positions on the size of battery collection targets and the deadline for reaching them.27 The 
size of the plot symbols is proportional to the combined voting weights of the member states 
holding that negotiation position. The voting weights for individual states range from 3 for small 
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 This informal comparison of different theories cannot replace a more rigorous empirical test. However, the 
discussion points to potential shortcomings of existing accounts and justifies the consideration of new alternatives.  
26
 Council (2005): Common position adopted by the Council on 18 July 2005 with a view to the adoption of the 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on batteries and accumulators and waste batteries and 
accumulators and repealing Directive 91/157/EEC. 6 July 2006, 5694/5/05 REV 5. The Council’s common position 
forms the basis for further inter-institutional negotiations with the European Parliament. Thus, the common position 
does not correspond to the final legislative act. The negotiation process surrounding the adoption of the common 
position on the batteries directive is described in detail in Häge 2008, 169-183. 
27
 Information on member state positions was derived from various internal Council documents. All documents are 
available from the public register of Council documents 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1279&lang=en). Four interviews with Commission, Council, and 
member state officials in May and June 2007 yielded additional insights into the negotiation process. 
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countries like Luxembourg or Malta to 29 for large countries like France or Germany.28 The arrows 
indicate changes in member state positions between snapshots. 
The Commission submitted its proposal for the batteries directive in November 2003, but 
negotiations in the Council did not start before June 2004.29 During one of its last meetings under 
the Irish presidency, the Council’s environment working party had a first reading of the proposal.30 
The working party is composed of officials from national environment ministries and deals with all 
matters related to the environment. The Dutch government, who took over the Council presidency 
in July 2004, made the proposal a priority.31 The environment working party discussed the proposal 
at seven occasions in July, October, and November, before asking the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (Coreper) for further guidance. Subsequently, the proposal shuttled back and forth 
four times between the working party and Coreper. Neither the officials in the environment 
working party, nor the deputy ambassadors in Coreper were able to reach an agreement. 
Eventually, Environment ministers struck a compromise at their meeting on 20 December 2004.  
The top left panel of Figure 2 shows the positions of member states before the first Coreper 
meeting on 24 November, after the environment working party had discussed the proposal and its 
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 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 189. 
29
 Commission (2003): Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on batteries and 
accumulators and spent batteries and accumulators. 21 November 2003, COM/2003/723. 
30
 Council (2004): Report of the meeting on 8 June 2004 of the Working Party on Environment. 22 June 2004, 
10743/04. 
31
 Council (2004): Dutch Presidency: Provisional agendas for Council meetings prepared by Coreper (Part 1). 30 June 
2004, 11014/04, p. 25. 
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policy implications in detail.32 Most member states agreed that a general ban on cadmium in 
batteries was a more practical solution than the closed-loop collection and recycling system 
proposed by the Commission. Conflict centred on a possible exception for batteries in handheld 
power-tools. The proponents of such an exception, mostly member states with a significant battery 
producing industry, argued that no alternative technology was yet available for such applications. 
The opponents of an exception disagreed with this assessment. Fearing the loss of hundreds of jobs 
in a large domestic battery factory, France most emphatically rejected any form of ban.33 Early 
during the negotiations, Poland and the United Kingdom also showed scepticism whether the 
environmental benefits would outweigh the economic and social costs of a ban (this position is 
coded as -8 on the horizontal axis of the panels in Figure 2). Germany, Italy, Ireland, and a number 
of small and medium sized member states from Eastern Europe agreed to a ban in general, but 
demanded an exemption for handheld power-tools or at least a much longer transition period than 
the four years suggested by the Council Presidency (coded as -5). Most of the remaining countries, 
including Spain and many Central and Northern European member states, could accept the 
Presidency’s proposal of a complete ban after a transition period of four years (coded as +5). Only 
Sweden and Denmark originally demanded a complete and immediate ban of those types of 
batteries (coded as +8).  
Figure 2 about here 
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 Council (2004): Report of the meeting on 10 November 2004 of the Working Party on Environment. 12 November 
2004, 14228/1/04; Council (2004): Report of the meeting on 18 November 2004 of the Working Party on Environment. 
19 November 2004, 14941/04.  
33
 Council (2004): Meeting document for the meeting on 10 November 2004 of the Working Party on Environment: 
French impact assessment. 4 November 2004, DS 742/04. 
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The second major disagreement revolved around the size of the binding collection targets. Many 
countries, including Germany and a number of Central and Northern European member states, 
supported the Presidency’s proposal of a collection target of 60% of sold batteries to be reached 
after 10 years through linear yearly increases in the proportion of collected batteries (coded as +4 
on the vertical axis of the panels in Figure 2). Denmark, one of the forerunners in terms of 
environmental standards, asked for an even more ambitious target (coded as +8). In contrast, Italy, 
the United Kingdom, and Latvia asked for a lower, more feasible target of 40% to be reached after 
10 years (coded as -8). The remaining countries, including France, Poland, and Spain, took an 
intermediate position, either favouring a nonlinear increase to a target value of up to 40% after 7 
years (coded as -4), or a nonlinear increase to a target value of up to 60% after 10 years (coded as 
0). Under both options, the nonlinear increase meant that the progress towards the target value 
could be smaller during the first few years after implementation of the new policy. 
The top right panel of Figure 2 shows the state of play of negotiations at the start of the 
second Coreper meeting on 1 December.34 The arrows in the top left panel indicate the changes in 
positions of member states that occurred during the Coreper meeting on 24 November and a 
subsequent meeting of the Environment working party on 25 November. The figure clearly shows 
that a number of member states moderated their positions, joining states with other, more centrist 
positions. The bottom left panel displays negotiation positions at the start of the third Coreper 
meeting on 8 December.35 In the meantime, the environment working party had met again on the 
3rd and 7th of December. The changes from the top right to the bottom left panel reveal a further 
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 Council (2004): Report of the meeting on 25 November 2004 of the Working Party on Environment. 26 November 
2004, 15204/04 ADD 1. 
35
 Council (2004): Report of the meeting on 8 December 2004 of the Working Party on Environment. 10 December 
2004, 15537/1/04 REV 1. 
15 
 
increase and consolidation of member states’ positions along both issue dimensions. Noteworthy, 
almost all member states originally favouring a complete cadmium ban after a four year transition 
period now conceded the inclusion of a review clause to allow for a possible extension of the 
exemption (coded as +2). As a new compromise proposal to reconcile the proponents and 
opponents of a cadmium ban, the Dutch presidency suggested to include an unlimited exemption 
for batteries for cordless power-tools in the directive, but with the possibility to include those types 
of batteries in the ban after a Commission review after four years (coded as -2). Finally, the lower 
right panel of Figure 2 shows the positions of member states before environment ministers 
continued negotiations at their Council meeting on 20 December, following another working party 
meeting on 9 December and another Coreper meeting on 13 December. Along the cadmium ban 
dimension, most opponents of a ban of cadmium batteries in cordless power tools were able to 
support the Presidency’s new compromise proposal of a review of the exemption after four years. 
Amongst the countries favouring a ban, Cyprus, Hungary, and Poland also embraced the 
Presidency’s compromise proposal. Along the collection target dimension, Italy, Latvia, and the 
United Kingdom abandoned their call for a very low target rate in favour of the somewhat more 
ambitious goal of a nonlinear increase to 40% after 7 years. 
As the lower right panel indicates, the end result of this process was three distinct, very 
similarly sized coalitions. As 90 votes are sufficient to block a Council decision, the consent of all 
three coalitions was required to adopt a decision. Therefore, the classic compromise outcome 
negotiated by ministers is not very surprising. In the end, member states agreed on an exemption of 
cordless power tools from the ban with a review of the exemption after four years. To make this 
solution acceptable to the proponents of a more encompassing ban, the Council’s common position 
explicitly stated that the review should be conducted “with a view to the prohibition of cadmium in 
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batteries” .36 Only Belgium and Ireland could not support this compromise and abstained from a 
vote. Belgium considered the partial cadmium ban not strict enough, while Ireland objected to the 
“closed” nature of the review of the exemption. The collection target was eventually set to 45% 
after 10 years, a value located between the 40% and 60% originally demanded by the two groups of 
countries. Although the final outcome was closer to the position of its own coalition than to the 
position of the opposing coalition, Italy and Greece still considered these collection targets to be 
too high and abstained from the vote.37 
The case points to several salient features of Council decision-making. First, the presidency 
of the Council plays a crucial role in facilitating the negotiation process by sounding out positions 
and offering compromise proposals. Second, the positions of member states tend to become more 
moderate during the course of negotiations. Finally, member states merge into larger and larger 
coalitions as the negotiation process progresses. While all these aspects are worth consideration, the 
model focuses on the last feature. The coalition formation process is most relevant for explaining 
consensus decision-making. Starting with often ill-defined and idiosyncratic negotiation positions, 
member states adapt their positions over time to form larger and larger groups. As a result of this 
process, groups of countries with similar negotiation positions form, each of them large enough to 
formally block a majority decision. Although it did not prevent negative votes in this particular 
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case, the need to take the positions of all groups into account when negotiating a compromise will 
often be sufficient to ensure unanimous support.  
A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF COALITION BUILDING DYNAMICS 
The agent-based computational model is designed to resemble the general dynamics of real-world 
coalition building as illustrated by the example of the batteries directive.38 I model coalition-
formation computationally for two reasons: First, formal models of coalition formation quickly 
become intractable when more than a very limited number of actors are considered.39 Second and 
more importantly, the theoretical argument stresses the central role of the process of coalition-
formation itself for the causal explanation of coalition patterns. Mathematical models face 
difficulties representing and exploring the consequences of such adaptive, history-dependent 
processes. 
At the core of the agent-based model lies a simple but empirically plausible assumption about 
individuals’ behaviour. Negotiators are conceptualised as boundedly rational actors.40 Such actors 
are still goal-oriented; yet navigating in complex and uncertain environments, they rely on simple 
heuristics to pursue their goals rather than on complicated assessments of the consequences of 
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different courses of action.41 At the start of Council negotiations, negotiators will find it hard to 
identify a generally acceptable policy outcome in a multidimensional policy space when the 
number of member states is large, let alone calculate favourable vote exchanges between various 
pairs of countries with different salience levels to generate a satisfactory logroll. However, 
negotiators are usually well able to identify the current positions of other negotiators. Negotiators 
also know that a decision will not be made under qualified majority voting without their consent if 
they are able to muster a blocking minority. Given the complexity of multilateral multi-issue 
negotiations, pursuing the formation of a blocking minority is a simple but effective way for 
negotiators to ensure that their views are reflected in the final negotiation outcome. At the same 
time, the reduction in the effective number of actors as a result of the aggregation of individual 
negotiation positions into joint positions of multi-actor coalitions enhances the chances of 
successful compromise proposals and logrolls at the end of the coalition-formation process. 
The assumption of negotiators as blocking minority seekers is not only theoretically 
plausible; it also receives considerable direct and indirect empirical support. In terms of indirect 
support, the importance of blocking minorities in Council decision-making is underlined by the 
Commission’s efforts to break up such coalitions by changing states’ preferences and fall-back 
options.42 Also, lobby groups that aim to prevent European regulation in a certain policy area focus 
their efforts on supporting and stabilizing blocking minorities.43 Finally, Council presidencies use 
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their scheduling prerogatives to ‘buy time’ to build blocking coalitions.44 Regarding the more direct 
support, interviews with national representatives indicate that they continuously assess whether a 
blocking minority exists when they negotiate in the Council.45 They also consider coalition-
building to be one of their most important negotiation tactics.46 This impression is also supported 
by insider accounts of practitioners: Westlake and Galloway explain that under qualified majority 
voting delegations need to construct blocking minorities to extract concessions from their 
negotiation partners.47 
The goal of the computational model is to explore the macro-consequences, especially with 
respect to the observed level of voting, resulting from the micro-behaviour of individual negotiators 
motivated by the desire to form a blocking minority. The model has only two changeable 
parameters, the number of member states and the voting threshold. This simplicity is necessary for 
understanding how the model generates its output. When computational models serve as theoretical 
tools rather than forecasting instruments, their complexity needs to be limited so that unambiguous 
predictions can be derived through computational experiments.48 Otherwise these models become 
just as unintelligible as the real world processes and phenomena they are supposed to explain. From 
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a substantive point of view, the number of member states, the voting threshold, and their interaction 
are important variables for enlargement policy and institutional design, not only in the case of the 
EU, but international organizations in general. 
For current purposes, the model ignores differences in voting weights of member states. From 
a scientific point of view, incorporating voting weights is problematic in at least two respects. First, 
the theory would be tailored to a specific voting system with a particular number of member states 
and a particular distribution of voting weights. Although the development of the model is motivated 
by the puzzling absence of voting in the Council of the EU, consensus decision-making is a salient 
feature of many international decision-making bodies. Thus, formulating the theory in abstract 
ways ensures its applicability to similar contexts beyond the EU, thereby increasing its utility.49 
Second, the incorporation of voting weights makes it impossible to distinguish between the 
individual effects on consensus decision-making of changes in membership size and changes in the 
distribution of voting weights, respectively. As the distribution of voting weights changes 
automatically and simultaneously with any change in the number of member states, we cannot 
determine experimentally to what extent any predicted change in the consensus rate is due to 
changes in the voting weights, changes in the number of member states, or the interaction of the 
changes in those two variables. A theoretical model that does not allow us to unambiguously 
                                                 
49
 Paul M. Kellstedt and Guy D. Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 26-28. Relatedly, more general theories are also desirable because they increase the number of 
observable implications that can potentially falsify them, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, 
Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 
19. 
21 
 
identify cause-effect relationships between its component variables is of limited use for 
understanding the real world.50 
In the model, member states’ ideal points are located in a two dimensional policy space, 
represented on a 21 x 21 square lattice. To make sure that simulation results do not depend on 
specific preference constellations, the integer coordinates for governments’ ideal points are 
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from -10 to +10 at the beginning of the 
simulation run. The initial negotiation position corresponds to the ideal point of the government. 
Each government representative then determines how large the coalition is to which the 
representative belongs. Technically, the representative counts the number of other governments 
occupying the same position. If the coalition is large enough to block a decision, the representative 
sticks to the current negotiation position. If the coalition is not large enough to block a decision, the 
representative compares the size of the current coalition to the size of the closest neighbouring 
coalition. Euclidean distances are calculated for these comparisons. If several coalitions are equally 
far away from the representative’s coalition, the size of the current coalition is compared to the size 
of the largest of those coalitions. If the neighbouring coalition identified through this procedure is 
as large as or larger than the current coalition, then the representative joins the neighbouring 
coalition. If the neighbouring coalition is smaller than the current coalition, the representative does 
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not change position, anticipating that the members of the neighbouring coalition will subsequently 
join his or her coalition.51 Each government representative decides about adapting his or her 
negotiation position in turn. The order of moves of governments is determined randomly in each 
round of the simulation run.52 The negotiators’ knowledge about their own and others’ negotiation 
positions and coalition statuses is updated after each negotiator’s move. Thus, government 
representatives are modelled as moving consecutively rather than concurrently. This modelling 
strategy corresponds to real world dynamics, in which negotiations take place in continuous time 
and negotiators do not all change their negotiation positions simultaneously.  
The simulation run can end in one of two ways. First, the simulation run ends if one of the 
coalitions is large enough to adopt a Council decision by qualified majority vote. Obviously, this 
outcome represents the case of a contested decision. Second, the simulation run ends if all 
negotiators have reached their intermediate goal of forming a blocking minority. If all member 
states are part of blocking coalitions, a Council decision can only be reached by accommodating all 
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views. Thus, this outcome represents a broad compromise of all member states; in other words, it 
represents a consensus decision.53 Note that the simulation ends only at the end of the current 
negotiation round, after each member state had its turn. Each round can be thought of as a meeting 
of the relevant Council body, in which a formal decision is only made after each negotiator had the 
opportunity to state his or her position. While negotiators take into account what their counterparts 
have said before them, they still get the opportunity to adjust their position even if the stated 
positions of previous speakers already indicate a winning majority. The model assumes that the 
presidency allows all representatives to express their opinions before calling for a vote. 
Figure 3 presents the dynamics of a typical simulation run with 25 member states and a 
qualified majority voting threshold of 72%. These settings mirror the situation in the batteries 
directive case discussed above. I ran the simulation 1,000 times; each time with a different, 
randomly generated initial preference configuration. The plotted run is typical in the sense that it is 
characterized by typical values on a number of variables calculated from those simulations. The run 
exemplifies the median number of rounds until run completion, the median number of coalitions at 
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the end of the run, and the median number of member states in the largest coalition at the end of the 
run. Finally, conditional on these characteristics, the run exhibits the median distance between 
member states’ negotiation positions at the start of the simulation.  
Figure 3 about here 
The top left panel of Figure 3 gives the initial positions of government representatives. The other 
panels show snapshots of the state of coalition building after each full round of adaptations. The 
arrows indicate movements of government positions between the snapshots; accompanying 
numbers show the sequence of those moves. The size of the marker symbol is increasing with the 
size of the coalition and the number of member states occupying a certain position is given inside 
the circle. The top left panel shows the distribution of ideal points of member state governments. 
By assumption, the ideal points are equivalent to governments’ initial negotiation positions. At 
least in the case of Council negotiations, these initial positions will be hard to observe 
systematically, as the documentary record often only starts once member states have formed 
somewhat consolidated coalitions. The snapshot in the top right panel of Figure 3 more closely 
resembles the real-world configurations of negotiation positions as shown in Figure 2. After the 
first round of adaptations, coalitions of varying sizes have already formed. The lower left and lower 
right panel of Figure 3 show how these coalitions merge until each member state is part of a 
blocking minority. 
The example run illustrates an important feature of the computational model. The stopping 
rules discussed above imply that the simulation does not stop until all member states are part of a 
blocking coalition, even when two or more already existing blocking coalitions are large enough to 
muster the required majority to adopt a decision by vote. The lower panels in Figure 3 illustrate this 
situation. The lower left panel depicts two large blocking coalitions, one with twelve and one with 
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nine member states. In addition, two smaller coalitions consisting of one and three member states 
exist. If the two blocking coalitions agreed on a compromise, they could easily outvote the other 
member states. Only 18 votes are required for a winning majority. However, the model assumes 
that the coalition building continues until all member states are part of a blocking minority. 
Consequently, the states of the two smaller coalitions are still able to join the blocking coalitions; 
only then does the simulation stop. 
At first sight, the implicit assumption that blocking coalitions ‘wait’ for the remaining states 
to become members of a blocking coalition before they negotiate a compromise amongst 
themselves seems to be inconsistent with the rational goal-orientation of actors. However, if the 
final compromise negotiated between blocking coalitions is at least somewhat affected by the 
coalition’s respective sizes, drawing out the negotiation process to allow ‘lonely’ member states to 
join one’s coalition is a very rational strategy. In the lower left panel of Figure 3, the members of 
the blocking coalition closer to the three-member coalition have a clear incentive to prolong the 
negotiation process in order for the members of the smaller coalition to join them. Striking a 
bargain requires the consent of all negotiation parties, thus the refusal of one blocking coalition is 
sufficient to extent the negotiation process. As depicted in the lower right panel, the delay in 
accepting a compromise has increased the coalition size from nine to twelve member states. 
Although the size of the larger blocking coalition has also increased by one member state during 
that time, the relatively stronger increase in the number of members of the smaller blocking 
coalition brought its size almost up to par and promises more leverage for extracting concessions. 
As the focus of this study is on coalition formation and voting, the determination of the substantive 
negotiation outcome is not explicitly modelled. However, existing empirical research indicates that 
models based on weighted averages of member states’ policy positions perform best in predicting 
26 
 
actual decision-making outcomes in the Council.54 Thus, the assumption that larger coalitions are 
better able to tilt the negotiation outcome in their favour is empirically supported. If negotiators are 
aware of this advantage, they have every reason to delay an agreement until their coalition has 
reached the largest possible size. In this sense, negotiators do not only seek a coalition that is able 
to block legislation, but once this aim is achieved, also a coalition that is as large as possible to 
exert a maximum degree of influence on negotiation outcomes.  
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF AGGREGATE MODEL OUTPUT 
The previous section described the setup of the computational model and the rules according to 
which actors are supposed to behave. The illustrative simulation run showed the similarities of the 
resulting model dynamics with real-world coalition building processes. Thus, the micro-
behavioural rules provide an empirically plausible causal mechanism. This section assesses to what 
extent these micro-behavioural rules are also able to generate the empirically observed rate of 
consensus decision-making at the macro-level. Any plausible model should be able to reproduce 
the two qualitative features of the aggregate voting data presented in Figure 1. First, the model 
should generate a generally high consensus rate: given the wide variation in consensus rates around 
the mean of 82%, a predicted rate between 74% and 90% would surely be acceptable. Second, the 
model’s prediction should be relatively insensitive to the number of member states. Thus, the 
predicted consensus rate should not change considerably with variations in membership size. While 
the model design explicitly aimed at reproducing the high consensus rate, the comparison across 
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membership sizes constitutes a first independent test of the theoretical model. None of the 
assumptions that entered the model formulation would lead us to expect insensitivity of consensus 
rates to changes in membership size. 
Figure 4 compares the predictions of the computational model with the observed data. The 
figure plots the observed yearly consensus rates between 1994 and 2006, the time averages of those 
rates for each membership size, as well as the predicted rates generated by the computational model 
for each membership size.55 Each predicted rate is the proportion of consensus outcomes generated 
by 1,000 simulated negotiation processes with different, randomly generated initial policy positions 
and a constant voting threshold of 72%.56 The simulated results of the computational model are 
compared to the rate expected by chance. The chance prediction of the null-model and the 
associated standard error are based on the expected value of a Binomial distribution with a 
probability of success of 0.5 and 1,000 trials. Comparing the null-model predictions with the 
predictions of the computational model, a measure of the proportional reduction in error (PRE) 
analogous to the familiar R-squared measure in linear regression analysis can be calculated. The 
main difference of this PRE-measure to R-squared is that it uses the prediction of the null-model 
rather than the mean of the observed data as the baseline for calculating the reduction in error. The 
predictions of the computational model are generated without taking into account any empirical 
information about the observed consensus rates. Hence, using the mean of the actually observed 
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consensus rates as a baseline for comparisons with the purely theoretical predictions of the 
computational model would be inappropriate.  
Figure 4 about here 
The predicted consensus rates of the computational model are remarkably close to the observed 
consensus rates. During the nine years in which the EU consisted of 15 member states, the 
consensus rate varied between 74% and 97%. The computational model predicts a consensus rate 
of 85%, very similar to the observed time-average of 82%. Compared to the prediction of the null 
model of 50%, the prediction of the computational model reduces the prediction error by 96%. 
During the three years in which the EU consisted of 25 member states, the consensus rate varied 
between 78% and 91%. Again, the computational model’s predicted consensus rate of 85% is very 
close to the mean of the actually observed, yearly consensus rates of 86%. Compared to the null-
model prediction, the prediction of the computational model reduces the prediction error by 97%. 
Only the computational model’s prediction for 12 member states is relatively far off from the 
observed data. The only available data point for 12 member states indicates a consensus rate of 
75% in the year 1994, while the computational model predicts a consensus rate of 89%. Given the 
generally high variability of the consensus rate over time, the source for this lack of correspondence 
is not clear. The model might do a worse job in predicting the consensus rate when the number of 
member states is rather small, or the observed year might have had an unusually low consensus 
rate. Either way, even this worst prediction decreases the prediction error of the null-model by 
68%. In total over the entire period, the model reduces the prediction error by 95%.57 
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THE PREDICTED EFFECTS OF VOTING THRESHOLD AND MEMBERSHIP SIZE 
The strong correspondence of the simulated coalition building dynamics and consensus rates with 
their real world equivalents warrant a further examination of the computational model. This section 
presents the results of a computational experiment. The goal of the experiment is to identify the 
consequences of changes in the voting threshold and the membership size on consensus decision-
making. The dependent variable in this analysis is the size of the winning coalition as a percentage 
of member states, measured at the end of the simulation run. By systematically varying the voting 
threshold and the number of member states, the independent and interactive effects of these two 
independent variables on the size of the winning coalition can be discerned. 
The number of member states is varied in the experiment from 6 to 30, resembling the 
actually observed range of the number of past, current, and potential future member states of the 
EU. The voting threshold is varied from 51% to 90%.58 For each combination of values of the 
independent variables, the simulation is run 1,000 times. For a given membership size, the use of an 
identical list of 1,000 random seeds to initiate the simulation ensures that the initial distribution of 
member states’ ideal points is exactly the same for all voting thresholds. However, when 
membership size is varied, the distribution of member states’ initial preferences cannot be the same, 
regardless of whether or not we keep the voting threshold constant. Still, the large number of 
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replications with randomly distributed ideal points ensures that the distribution of initial 
preferences of member states do not systematically affect those simulation results. 
Figure 5 about here 
Figure 5 summarizes the simulated data and describes the relationship between voting threshold 
and winning coalition size. The figure presents the results of a nonlinear quantile regression 
analysis.59 Each individual panel shows the differences in winning coalition size predicted from 
changes in the voting threshold, keeping the membership size constant. The data points in the 
panels represent the conditional medians of the simulated winning coalition sizes for different 
values of the voting threshold. The black curve indicates the nonlinear median fit. The conditional 
distributions of winning coalition size are often strongly skewed and include outliers. Thus, median 
regression is a more appropriate technique to identify the typical value of winning coalition size for 
a certain voting threshold than mean regression. The shaded areas in Figure 5 represent the 
predicted inter-quartile ranges of the conditional distributions. They provide information about the 
effect of the voting threshold on the shape rather than the location of the winning coalition size 
distribution.60 The figure shows that for low voting thresholds, winning coalition size varies over 
almost the entire theoretically possible range of values. However, this variability decreases rapidly 
with increases in the voting threshold. The figure also indicates the size of the effective voting 
threshold, which is the minimum number of member states required to satisfy the formal threshold, 
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expressed as a proportion of the total number of member states. The effective voting threshold is 
shown by the grey line taking the form of a step-function. 
Figure 5 demonstrates that the nonlinear power function describes the relationship between 
voting threshold and median winning coalition size rather well. The non-zero intercepts of the 
curves indicate that the winning coalitions are somewhat oversized, even when the formal voting 
threshold requires only a simple majority. Because the difference between the effective and the 
formal voting threshold is larger when the number of member states is smaller, the intercept of the 
curve tends to be larger as well. The predicted winning coalition size increases relatively quickly 
with increases in the voting threshold until it reaches its conceptual maximum of 100%. This limit 
is usually reached at around a voting threshold of 65 to 70%, regardless of membership size, and 
remains constant for higher values of the voting threshold. The panel at the bottom left of the figure 
indicates that the curves estimated for different membership sizes are very similar, indicating a 
relatively small effect of changes in the number of members states, and that those changes only 
affect winning coalition size when the voting threshold is relatively low.  
The analysis above suggests that membership size has little effect on consensus decision-
making, but that higher voting thresholds increase the likelihood that acts are adopted without 
contesting votes. To illustrate this effect, the consequences of future changes in the EU’s voting 
threshold on the predicted consensus rate can be considered. In 2014, the new voting system 
introduced by the Lisbon treaty will come into force, reducing the primary voting threshold in the 
Council from 74 to 65%. According to the model, this 9 percentage point decrease in the voting 
threshold will result in a disproportionally large reduction in the rate of consensual decisions of 25 
percentage points. While the predicted consensus rate for the current Nice treaty rules is 88%, the 
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rate under the new Lisbon treaty rules is expected to decline to 63%, implying a considerable 
increase in the occurrence of explicit voting in the Council.61  
CONCLUSION 
This paper presents an agent-based model of coalition-building to explain consensus decision-
making in the Council of the EU. Negotiators are modelled as adaptive blocking-minority seekers. 
Relying purely on current information about member states’ publicly stated negotiation positions, 
negotiators join larger and larger groups of other member states with similar policy positions until 
they are part of a group that is able to block a decision by vote. If all member states become part of 
a blocking minority before a winning coalition forms, a Council decision can only be reached 
through a compromise agreement of all coalitions. Thus, consensus emerges endogenously as an 
unintended by-product of the coalition-building process. As illustrated through a case study of the 
adoption of the Council’s common position on the batteries directive, the model generates coalition 
building dynamics that resemble those in real-world cases, providing an empirically plausible 
causal mechanism for the generation of consensus decisions. Furthermore, the model’s aggregate 
quantitative predictions for the rate of consensus decisions also correspond well with the 
empirically observed rates. Importantly, the model is able to reproduce the observation of a largely 
constant consensus rate despite large increases in membership size during the study period. The 
model does not include any assumptions specifically incorporated to reproduce this feature of the 
observed rate, so this finding constitutes an important independent test of the theory. 
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The predictive success of the model increases confidence in its usefulness and justified 
further investigations of its properties. A computational experiment of the effects of the voting 
threshold on the typical winning coalition size demonstrates a positive relationship between the two 
variables, which is largely unaffected by variation in membership size. The higher the voting 
threshold, the easier it is for member states to construct a blocking minority before others have 
formed a winning majority. Of course, the converse holds as well. Thus, if the model captures the 
essentials of coalition building in the Council, the envisaged reduction of the voting threshold 
under the Lisbon treaty will greatly reduce the number of decisions adopted by consensus. In 
contrast, further extensions of membership through enlargements are not expected to have any 
discernible effect on consensus decision-making. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to present a new theory and to establish its plausibility 
by demonstrating that its assumptions about micro-behaviour and its predictions about macro-
outcomes are consistent with empirical evidence. Although existing theories seem to have 
difficulties accounting for the non-sensitivity of the observed consensus rate to changes in 
membership size over time, rigorously evaluating this proposition would require a systematic 
comparative test. While such a test is beyond the scope of the current study, it presents a promising 
avenue for future research. Besides comparing the predictive power of entirely different types of 
explanations, like logrolling, compliance, or socialization theories, to the predictive power of the 
coalition-building model, another fruitful endeavour would be to assess the relative performance of 
different micro-behavioural rules for coalition-building within the same agent-based modelling 
framework. In the current model, negotiators are modelled as pure policy-seekers who join larger 
coalitions that occupy positions close-by in policy space. However, empirical research on 
cooperation and communication networks in the Council suggests that larger member states are 
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approached with higher frequency than smaller ones.62 Similarly, cultural homophily or general 
ideological closeness of governments might play a role in the choice of coalition partners.63 These 
alternative assumptions about member states’ motivations and decision heuristics could be 
substituted in the agent-based model to evaluate their relative merit. 
We might be able to exclude some of these alternative theories purely on the ground that they 
are unable to generate the high consensus rates observed in the Council. For other alternative 
theories, a comparison of their predictions with the observed data on consensus rates might not 
provide a decisive empirical test. Yet, even if theories make observationally equivalent predictions 
about aggregate decision-making outcomes, other observable implications about the posited 
process or causal mechanism supposedly producing those outcomes can be evaluated. For example, 
if the logrolling perspective was correct, then we would expect to see more or less simultaneous 
moves of pairs of member states or coalitions to a position in policy space that is not currently 
occupied by either of them: Coalition A joins the position of coalition B on issue 1 and coalition B 
joins the position of coalition A on issue 2 in return. In contrast, according to the coalition-building 
model, coalitions do not merge by agreeing to move to a new location in policy space, but by the 
smaller coalition joining the current location of the larger one. Also, while logrolling can involve 
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 Daniel Naurin and Rutger Lindahl, 'Out in the Cold? Flexible Integration and the Political Status of Euro Opt-Outs', 
European Union Politics, 11 (2010), 485-509; Jan Beyers and Guido Dierickx, 'The Working Groups of the Council of 
the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations?', Journal of Common Market Studies, 36 
(1998), 289-317. 
63
 Mikko Mattila, 'Contested Decisions: Empirical Analysis of Voting in the European Union Council of Ministers', 
European Journal of Political Research, 43 (2004), 29-50; Daniel Naurin, 'Coalition-Building in International 
Multilateral Negotiations: Party Ideology, National Interests and in-Group Bias in the Council of the European Union', 
Paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, 28-31 August 2008, Boston. 
35 
 
sudden changes in negotiation positions spanning the entire policy space, the coalition-building 
model expects incremental changes with coalitions only joining other coalitions that occupy 
positions that are close-by in policy space. An advantage of agent-based models is that they 
produce a wealth of predictions not only about the outcome of decision-making, but also about 
various aspects of the process. In order to fully exploit this feature of agent-based models for 
competitive empirical theory tests, future research should endeavour to collect detailed individual 
level data on how negotiation positions of member states change over time, on who forms 
coalitions with whom, and on how a compromise agreement is eventually reached. 
The development of the model presented in this paper was mainly motivated by the puzzling 
absence of voting in legislative decision-making of the Council of the EU. However, nothing in the 
model is tailored specifically to this context. Indeed, the model is potentially applicable to any 
decision-making situation that involves a group of actors making decisions by majority vote in the 
absence of hierarchical coordination or control of their voting behaviour. The latter condition 
implies that the model is not applicable to legislatures with strong party discipline. In such 
situations, the individual members of a party form a quasi-permanent coalition, they do not engage 
in independent coalition building behaviour themselves, and their voting behaviour is largely 
determined by the instructions of their party leadership. Thus, decision-making in many legislative 
institutions, especially those directly representing citizens, is beyond the scope of this theory. 
However, to the extent that party control is less prevalent in territorially based legislative chambers 
like the United States Senate or the German Bundesrat, the theory might be able to shed some light 
on decision-making in such bodies. More clearly, the theory should be applicable to multilateral 
negotiations in international organizations and other international forums that formally use a form 
of majority rule to adopt decisions. Examples include the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
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the World Trade Organization, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and decision-making 
bodies set up by multilateral environmental agreements. A priory, applying the theory to those 
contexts seems promising, as all of those organizations are known for regularly producing 
consensus decisions as well.64 
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APPENDIX: SIMPLIFIED NETLOGO CODE FOR COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
 
;; NEGOTIATOR BEHAVIOR 
to update-coalition-status  
set my-coalition-size sum [my-voting-weight] of member-states-here 
set blocking-minority? my-coalition-size >= blocking-size-threshold 
set winning-majority? my-coalition-size >= winning-size-threshold 
end 
 
to choose-coalition 
if not blocking-minority? [ 
survey-other-positions 
if my-coalition-size <= alternative-coalition-size [ 
join-other-coalition 
] 
] 
end 
 
to survey-other-positions 
let other-positions other member-states with [distance myself > 0.01] 
let closest-positions other-positions with-min [distance myself] 
set alternative-coalition max-one-of closest-positions [my-coalition-size] 
set alternative-coalition-size [my-coalition-size] of alternative-coalition 
end 
 
to join-other-coalition 
let move-distance distance alternative-coalition 
set heading towards alternative-coalition  
forward move-distance 
end 
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;; SYSTEM 
to setup 
create-member-states number-of-member-states 
ask member-states [setxy random-pxcor random-pycor] 
ask member-states [update-coalition-status] 
end 
 
to go 
if all? member-states [blocking-minority?] [stop] 
if any? member-states with [winning-majority?] [stop] 
ask member-states [ 
update-coalition-status 
choose-coalition 
update-coalition-status ] 
tick 
ask member-states [update-coalition-status]  
end 
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Fig. 1 Consensus Decision-Making in the Council of the EU, 1994-2006 
Note: The figure plots the percentage of consensual legislative decisions of the Council per year from 1994 
to 2006. The curve was produced by a locally weighted regression (Lowess) smoother. The two vertical 
dotted lines indicate the enlargements of the EU in 1995 and 2004, respectively. Sources: Years 1994-2002 
from Heisenberg (2005), years 2003-2006 from Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007); see text for 
further details.  
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Fig. 2 Real-World Coalition Building Dynamics in the Council of the EU 
Note: The figure provides snapshots of the coalition building dynamics of Council negotiations between 
June and December 2004, leading to the adoption of a common position on the batteries directive. Member 
states’ positions are measured on an ordinal scale and the numerical axis values should be interpreted 
accordingly. The arrows indicate changes in positions between two snapshots. The size of the plotting 
symbol is proportional to the combined voting weight of states holding a certain position, which is also 
indicated by the number inside the circle. Country abbreviations and voting weights (Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace, The Council of Ministers, 265): AT = Austria (10), BE = Belgium (12), CY = Cyprus (3), CZ = 
Czech Republic (12), DE = Germany (29), DK = Denmark (7), EL = Greece (12), EE = Estonia (4), ES = 
Spain (27), FI = Finland (7), FR = France (29), HU = Hungary (12), IE = Ireland (7), IT = Italy (29), LT = 
Lithuania (7), LU = Luxembourg (3), LV = Latvia (4), MT = Malta (3), NL = Netherlands (13), PL = Poland 
(27), PT = Portugal (12), SE = Sweden (10), SI = Slovenia (4), SK = Slovakia (7), UK = United Kingdom 
(27). 
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Fig. 3 Coalition Building Dynamics: A Typical Model Run 
Note: The figure shows the coalition building dynamics of a typical model run for a membership size of 25 
states and a voting threshold of 72%. The model run is typical in that it exhibits the median values for the 
number of rounds until run completion, for the number of coalitions at the end of the run, for the number of 
member states in the largest coalition at the end of the run, and conditional on these characteristics, for the 
median distance between member states’ initial positions. The upper left panel shows the initial positions of 
member states. Subsequent changes and their sequence are indicated by arrows and numbers, respectively. 
The upper right, lower left, and lower right panels show the positions of member states after the first, 
second, and third round of adaptations. The diameter of the plot symbols increases with the size of the 
coalition and the number inside the circles indicates the number of member states occupying this position. 
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Fig. 4 Observed versus Predicted Consensus Rates 
Note: The figure compares the observed consensus rates with the rate expected based on simulation results 
(Computational Model) and with the rate expected by chance (Null-Model). The proportional reduction in 
error is calculated as PRE = (SSEnull-SSEmodel)/SSEnull, where SSE stands for sum of squared errors. The 
voting threshold was set to 72% across all membership sizes. For each membership size, the figure shows 
the mean consensus rate and 95% confidence intervals of 1,000 simulation runs. The corresponding results 
for the null-model are based on the expected value and the standard deviation of a Binomial distribution, 
where the number of trials is 1,000 and the probability of success is 0.5.  
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Fig. 5. Effect of Voting Threshold on Winning Coalition Size by Membership Size 
Note: This figure shows the nonlinear relationship between voting threshold and winning coalition size for 
different membership sizes. The data points indicate the conditional medians of the simulated winning 
coalition sizes for different values of the voting threshold. The black curve represents the predicted median 
value and the grey area represents the predicted interquartile range, both estimated by nonlinear quantile 
regression. Each regression analysis is based on N = 9,000. The grey line shows the effective voting 
threshold as a function of the formal voting threshold. The bottom left panel compares the prediction curves 
across different membership sizes. 
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